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Abstract
I developed a dynamic deterministic general equilibrium model accounting for
human capital accumulation through both home education and schooling. The
model is characterized by an altruistic link between households of succeeding gen-
erations in the sense parents, caring about their children’s welfare, freely impart
them some knowledge at home in addition to helping them financially when they are
schooling. The education regime is private and features distinguishing my model
from related works are: (1) young households are economically active and work
part-time while schooling, (2) allocating time to schooling or labor entails disu-
tility, (3) tuition is proportional to the time allocated to schooling. I calibrated
the model to some balanced growth facts observed between 1981 and 2013 in the
Province of Quebec.
The model is then used to investigate the contribution of human capital to
economic growth. To do that, I simulate it assuming in turn a permanent rise in
the tuition rate and the household’s ability to learn. Each of these two shocks
reveals a positive correlation between education, human capital, and output. The
predictions of the model are then used to shed a light on the student crisis Quebec
witnessed in 2012 following our former Liberal government’s decision to increase
tuition. I predict that raising tuition will neither harm education nor negatively
impact on students’ ability to pay.
Keywords: Education, economic growth, human capital, overlapping generations.
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31 Introduction
Becker’s 1964 seminal work and subsequent studies including Lucas Jr (1988), Barro
(1991, 2001), and Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) shed a light on the key role played
by human capital in economic growth. Human capital, defined as the ability to perform
labor, can be acquired through education and experience. Accumulating human capital
enhances households’ productivity, induces additional investment in physical capital,
and favors economic growth. 1 In the same time, some authors such as Bils and
Klenow (2000) questioned, on the basis of some empirical evidence, the importance
given to the contribution to economic growth of human capital accumulation through
formal education. By formal education, I mean schooling. Conversely, several authors
investigated the impact of economic growth on human capital accumulation. DeJong
and Ingram (2001) showed that, in the US over the sample period 1970-1996, college
enrolments used as a proxy for human capital accumulation through schooling was
negatively correlated with output growth rate. They also found that an increase in
wage induced by a positive technology shock negatively impacted on human capital
accumulation. As for Fowler and Young (2004), human capital accumulation by young
households is rather procyclical.
This essay specifically deals with the contribution to economic growth of human
capital accumulation through both home and formal education. Home education, also
known as intergenerational knowledge spill-over, is about young households inheriting
without any effort some of their parents’ knowledge whereas formal education involves
some resource, precisely time and income, allocations. 2 Lucas Jr (1988) advocated
the modeling of home education arguing that ”human capital accumulation is a social
activity, involving groups of people”. In modeling households’ decision to invest in
education, one of the following two assumptions are often made about their life span:
(1) they are infinitely-lived (Razin, 1972; Lucas Jr, 1988; DeJong and Ingram, 2001),
or (2) they are finitely-lived (Tran-Nam, Truong, and Van Tu, 1995; Shimomura and
Tran-Nam, 1997; Heckman, Lochner, and Taber, 1998; Sadahiro and Shimasawa, 2002).
I follow the latter class of models, viz, households in my model are finitely-lived and, in
addition, are heterogeneous in their age. This framework called overlapping generations
(OLG) originated from Samuelson’s 1958 and Diamond’s 1965 contributions. The use of
the OLG framework is motivated by the fact that: (1) education is an investment that
largely takes place in the earlier stage of a household’s life-cycle, (2) the financing of
education could involve the contribution of older generations of households. The OLG
framework helps easily represent these realities.
The contribution of older generations of households to education financing could
be modeled in several ways depending on whether the education regime entertained is
public or private. Under a public regime, education is free and financed out of income
tax revenue (Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992; Tran-Nam, Truong, and Van Tu, 1995).
Under a private regime, it costs to get educated and altruistic parents directly pay for
1Aghion and Howitt (1998, 2009) reviewed some popular theories and empirics on this subject.
2Henceforth, whenever I mention education without any further precision, I am referring to formal
education. The expressions education and schooling will therefore be used interchangeably.
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their children’s education (Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992) whereas selfish parents just
grant them a loan they reimburse when they finish schooling. (Tran-Nam, Truong,
and Van Tu, 1995; Shimomura and Tran-Nam, 1997). In the model I have developed
herein, the education regime is private and young households generously receive some
financial transfers from their parents. I allow the transfer a young household receives
to differ from the tuition he pays. Some features distinguishing my model from that of
Glomm and Ravikumar are: (1) I have allowed young households to work part-time while
schooling, (2) the way I have modeled altruism, and (3) tuition is proportional to the
time allocated to schooling. Students working part-time on or off campus to finance their
needs is nowadays an overwhelming reality that I want my model to take into account.
Besides, students, especially those pursuing a university degree, are economically active
agents and do not necessarily live under the same roof as their parents. To take this
into account, I have modeled young households’ consumption decision separately from
their parents’ one.
In the literature, altruism means caring about one’s offspring welfare. There are two
possible ways of modeling it. The first way is to posit that parents value their children’s
welfare, as Barro (1974) did. The second way is to say parents value the quality of
education passed on to their children, as Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) did. With
Barro’s recursive modeling of altruism, one ends up expressing a household’s welfare
as a weighted sum of his life-cycle utility and that of each of his descendants. In my
OLG framework, altruism is in the sense of Barro. All households therefore have their
preferences defined over their own consumption and leisure and their children’s welfare.
As a consequence, allocating time to schooling or labor entails disutility. Most growth
models with endogenous accumulation of human capital that I surveyed abstracted
from these disutilities for convenience reasons. I have represented the preferences over
consumption and leisure by a logarithmic utility function.
There are interesting features in other models that I do not take into account. For
instance, Tran-Nam, Truong, and Van Tu (1995) Shimomura and Tran-Nam (1997)
introduced uncertainty in the outcome of education, i.e., a student may or may not
succeed in education. For convenience reasons, I have modeled deterministically the
human capital production sector. The human capital accumulated by a household,
in my model, positively and with certainty depends on his ability to learn, the time
he has allocated to education, and the level of his parents’ human capital. Similar
approaches include on the one hand Lucas Jr (1988) who modeled human capital as a
cumulative outcome of the time allocated each period to education and on the other
hand Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) who used a Cobb-Douglas technology to model
the human capital accumulation process with as inputs the time allocated to education,
the educational expenses, and the human capital inherited from parents. Whereas the
quality of education is held constant in the former model, in the latter one, it depends
on the household’s educational expenses. The household’s ability to learn, in my model,
is a time-dependent parameter whose motion may depend on several factors including
the household’s personal aptitude, the total factor productivity as Fowler and Young
(2004) did, the quality of the available didactic resources as well as that of teachers.
The other production sector in my model is the one manufacturing the final output. I
5have modeled this sector using a Cobb-Douglas technology with as inputs both human
and physical capital. While such authors as Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998),
Sadahiro and Shimasawa (2002), and Fowler and Young (2004) included physical capital
as input other authors such as Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), Tran-Nam, Truong, and
Van Tu (1995), and Shimomura and Tran-Nam (1997), seeking a tractable analytical
solution, abstracted from this input. My choice to include physical capital is motivated
by the fact that households’ decision to accumulate human capital through schooling
impacts on their savings and consequently on physical capital accumulation because
schooling entails allocating less time to labor in addition to paying tuition fees.
The rest of this paper consists of four sections. In the next section, which is Section 2,
my model is sketched. It is made up of two (production) sectors: the human capital
sector operated by some overlapping generations of households and the final output
sector operated by (business) firms. The model is characterized by an altruistic link
between members of succeeding generations. Parents, in addition to educating their
children at home, could financially help them while they are schooling.
Some theoretical results emerging from households and firms’ optimizing behavior are
presented in Section 3. It appears that a young household substitutes education for
labor at a rate greater than unity. Furthermore, within an altruistic economy, a young
household always allocates more time to leisure than his parents do.
In Section 4, the dynamic deterministic general equilibrium (DDGE) model that I have
built is calibrated to some balanced growth facts observed in the Province of Quebec
between 1981 and 2013. It is then solved numerically and simulated assuming in turn
a permanent rise in the tuition rate and the household’ ability to learn. The purpose
of these simulations is to show the implied long-run relationship between education,
human capital, output, and some other variables. These two shocks reveal a positive
correlation between output and education and human capital. However, the simulated
correlation coefficients generated from the shock on the household’s ability to learn are
higher than those generated from the shock on the tuition rate.
Finally, in Section 5, the predictions from the model are used to investigate the student
crisis referred to as Maple Spring that Quebec witnessed in 2012. 3 As a matter of fact,
on March 17, 2011, Quebec’s former Liberal Finance Minister, Mr Raymond Bachand,
announced in his 2011-2012 budget speech an increase in university tuition. From Fall
2012 till 2017, tuition would increase each year by $ 325 to reach $ 3 793 in 2017. To
protest against this decision, students started on February 13, 2012 what became the
longest student strike in Quebec’s history. My model predicts that students should not
worry too much about the rise in tuition since it will induce a rise in the educational
transfer they receive along with an increase in their human capital stock. I also made
some policy recommendations in that final section.
3The reference Maple Spring was made in relation to the popular uprisings named Arab spring that
were going on in the Arab world at the same time. Maple, which is called E´rable and is a homophone
of Arabe in French, is a common tree in Quebec that produces syrup in the beginning of Spring
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2 The Model
The economy consists of two agents: (1) some overlapping generations of households
and (2) firms.
The households – Each generation of households lives for three periods of time.
During the first period where they are young, households invest some time in formal
education to accumulate human capital and, at the same time, work part-time. They
then become mature, are full-time employed, and procreate. They are pensioned off
during the third period and pass away later on. Population grows exponentially at the
exogenous rate 0 < n < 1. Households are altruistic and have preferences defined over
consumption, leisure, and their children’s welfare. Therefore, following Barro (1974),
the welfare of a household born at time t = 0, 1, 2, . . . can be defined as
ut =
2∑
g=0
1
(1 + ρ)g
[ln cg,t+g + σ lnλg,t+g] +
1 + n
(1 + φ)(1 + ρ)
ut+1,
hence the following (linear-in-life-cycle-utility) social welfare
ut =
∞∑
t=0
[
1 + n
(1 + φ)(1 + ρ)
]t 2∑
g=0
1
(1 + ρ)g
[ln cg,t+g + σ lnλg,t+g] , (2.1)
with 0 < (1 + n)/(1 + φ)(1 + ρ) < 1. The parameters −1 < φ < 1, 0 < ρ < 1,
and σ > 0 are respectively the selfishness parameter, the time preference rate, and
leisure weight. When φ < 0, one has ρ > ρ+ φ(1 + ρ), viz, ρ, the time preference rate
used by the household to discount his own life-cycle utility, is greater than ρ+φ(1+ ρ),
the intergenerational time preference rate. He is then said to be altruistic. On the
other hand, a positive φ is a sign of selfishness. The variables cg,t+g and 0 < λg,t+g < 1
are respectively the consumption and leisure at time t + g of a household aged g. A
household faces the following constraints
λgt = 1− egt − lgt, 0 ≤ egt, lgt, λgt ≤ 1 (2.2a)
h1t+1 = (1 + ψte0t)h0t, ψt > 0 (2.2b)
h0t =
γ
1 + n
h1t, 0 < γ < 1 (2.2c)
a1t+1 = wtl0th0t + ǫ1t − c0t − fte0t (2.2d)
a2t+2 = wt+1l1t+1h1t+1 + (1 + rt+1)a1t+1 − c1t+1 − (1 + n)ǫ1t+1 (2.2e)
c2t+2 = (1 + rt+2)a2t+2. (2.2f)
Constraint (2.2a) states a household shares his time endowment normalized to unity
between leisure, education e0t, and labor lg,t+g. Constraint (2.2b) relates h1t+1, the
human capital stock after graduation, to the amount of time he allocated to education.
The parameter ψt in that constraint is the household’s ability to learn. Relation (2.2c) is
about home education. It says, parents by raising their children hand down to them
7some of their knowledge. 4 The share γ is referred to as the intergenerational knowledge
spill-over coefficient. Relations (2.2d) through (2.2f) are the household’s life cycle budget
constraints. During the first period of his life, he receives both labor income and an
educational transfer ǫ1t from his parents. The variable wt denotes the real wage at
time t. The labor income depends on both his hours worked and human capital stock.
Out of his incomes, he finances his consumption and tuition; what is left is invested
in financial assets. The tuition paid, fte0t, is proportional to the time allocated to
education. During the second period, the household receives both labor and financial
assets incomes. The variable rt+1 denotes the real interest rate at time t+1. From the
budget constraint (2.2f) one could see that, during retirement, the household lives only
on his financial assets income and leaves no bequest at the end of his life. It is worth
noting that households have perfect foresight and both formal education, viz attending
a university, and home education are the only ways of accumulating human capital.
The tuition rate ft is set exogenously. The representative household maximizes (2.1),
the social welfare, subject to constraints (2.2a) through (2.2f).
The firms – The aggregate production technology operated by firms is Cobb-Douglas
and defined by
Yt = K
α
t [exp(xt)Ht]
1−α , 0 < α < 1. (2.3)
The variables Yt, Kt, and Ht are respectively the aggregate output, physical capital,
and effective labor. The parameters x and α are respectively the exogenous labor-
augmenting technological progress growth rate and the share of physical capital income
in the aggregate output. They maximize their profit defined as
max
Kt, Ht
Kαt [exp(xt)Ht]
1−α − (1 + rt)Kt − wtHt.
In the above expression, 1+rt, the rental price of the aggregate physical capital, indicates
that this input completely depreciates or becomes out-of-date at the end of each time
period.
3 The General and Balanced Growth Equilibria
Before defining the general equilibrium, i.e., the equilibrium on all the markets, the
equations derived from households and firms’ optimizing behavior are presented. The
first order conditions (FOCs) from households’ optimization problem are 5
σc0t = wth0t(1− e0t − l0t) (3.1a)
σc1t = wth1t(1− l1t) (3.1b)
(1 + rt+1)c0t = (1 + ρ)c1t+1 (3.1c)
(1 + rt+1)c1t = (1 + ρ)c2t+1 (3.1d)
4The expressions children, students, and young households are interchangeably used herein. Idem
for the expressions mature households and parents. Given, on the one hand, the relationship between
the households and, on the hand, their occupations, it has been difficult to stick to one expression.
5These results are detailed lin the Appendix.
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c1t = (1 + φ)c0t (3.1e)
γ
[
l0t+1 +
(
1 +
ft+1
wt+1h0t+1
)
e0t+1
]
+ l1t+1 =
1 + rt+1
ψt
wt
wt+1
(
1 +
ft
wth0t
)
−
γ
ψt+1
(
1 +
ft+1
wt+1h0t+1
)
. (3.1f)
The conditions (3.1a) and (3.1b) are respectively the trade–off made between consump-
tion and leisure during the first and second stages of the life cycle. The Euler equa-
tions (3.1c) and (3.1d) are about the households’ inter-temporal consumption choice.
Relation (3.1e) explains the difference between a household and his children’s contem-
poraneous consumption in terms of altruism/selfishness. As for (3.1f), it is about the
intra-temporal trade-off between education and labor. Some theoretical evidence that
emerges from the model are now highlighted.
Proposition 3.1 (Education-Labor Trade-off). When the tuition is proportional to
the time allocated to schooling, a unit increase (decrease) in the latter activity, ceteris
paribus, results in a greater decrease (increase) in the time allocated to labor.
Proof. From (3.1f), it transpires that the marginal rate of substitution of education for
labor is greater than one in absolute value
∂l0t+1
∂e0t+1
= −
(
1 +
ft+1
wt+1h0t+1
)
.
Proposition 3.1 comes from the fact that increasing the time allocated to schooling
occasions two costs: the forgone wage and the additional tuition. If tuition were lump-
sum or formal education were free, the household would instead decrease the time
allocated to labor on a one-one basis when the time allocated to schooling increased.
Proposition 3.2 (Altruistic Parents and their Children’s Leisure). Within an altruistic
economy, children allocate more time to leisure than their parents do.
Proof. Consider (3.1a) describing the intra-temporal trade-off between consumption and
leisure made by a young household. Divide this by (3.1b) to get
c0t
c1t
=
h0t
h1t
λ0t
λ1t
Using (3.1e) to replace c1t in the above relation by (1+φ)c0t and then calling on (2.2c),
one gets
λ0t
λ1t
=
1 + n
γ(1 + φ)
> 1, for− 1 < φ < 0, (3.2)
which establishes the claim made in Proposition 3.2.
9Note that even if parents were selfish, i.e., φ > 0, (3.2) would still hold so long as
φ < (1 + n)/γ − 1.
At equilibrium, both human and physical capital are remunerated at their marginal
productivity.
α
Yt
Kt
= 1 + rt (3.3a)
(1− α)
Yt
Ht
= wt (3.3b)
Definition 3.3 (General Equilibrium). It consists of prices {(ft, rt, wt)}
∞
t=0, an aggre-
gate state of the world {(ψt, exp(xt))}
∞
t=0, and allocations:
- {(a1t+1, c0t, e0t, l0t)}
∞
t=0 for young households,
- {(a2t+1, c1t, ǫ1t, h1t, l1t)}
∞
t=0 for mature households,
- {(c2t)}
∞
t=0 for elderly households, and
- {(Ht, Kt, Yt)}
∞
v=0 for firms,
solving simultaneously:
1. the households’ optimization problem, i.e., relations (3.1a) through (3.1f) along
with the constraints (2.2a) through (2.2f),
2. the firms’ optimization problem, i.e., relations (2.3), (3.3b) and (3.3a),
and clearing
3. the financial and labor markets, i.e.,
Kt =
(
a1t +
a2t
1 + n
)
N0t
1 + n
Ht = (γl0t + l1t)
N0t
1 + n
h1t,
where N0t is the number of households born at time t.
The time households allocate to education and labor, respectively e0t, l0t, and l1t,
are stationary variables, i.e., they fluctuate around their constant means e0, l0, and l1.
Following the literature (DeJong and Ingram 2001 and Fowler and Young 2004, among
others), I consider the household’s ability to learn ψt as a stationary parameter.
It follows from (2.2b) and (2.2c) that h1t+1 = γ(1+ψte0t)h1t/(1+n). I then assume
the autoregressive parameter γ(1 + ψte0t)/(1 + n) is greater than one, which implies
human capital stock after graduation, h1t, is a trended variable. The parameter ν will
now denote this latter autoregressive parameter along the balanced growth path (BGP).
Then, in Definition 3.3, the equilibrium condition on the labor market suggests the gross
growth rate of Ht along the BGP is (1 + n)ν.
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Since technological progress is labor-augmenting and given the growth rate of effec-
tive labor, aggregate output and physical capital are constrained to grow each period by
the factor (1+n)ν exp(x) along the BGP. It then turns out that the real wage wt grows
at the same rate a technological progress whereas the real interest rate is stationary.
The tuition rate ft and all the other per capita variables grow at the gross rate ν exp(x).
I have removed the trend from the non-stationary variables by dividing them by
their growth components, which gives rise to the variables yˆt = Yt/[N0tν
t exp(xt)],
kˆt = Kt/[N0tν
t exp(xt)], h¯t = Ht/(1 + n)ν
t, w˜t = wt/ exp(xt), h¯1t = h1t/ν
t, and
zˆt = zt
/
[νt exp(xt)] with zt = {a1t, a2t, c0t, c1t, c2t, ft, ǫ1t}. The expressions that follow
define some variables and ratios along the BGP.
r = (1 + φ)(1 + ρ)ν exp(x)− 1 (3.4a)
w˜ = (1− α)
[
α
(1 + φ)(1 + ρ)ν exp(x)
] α
1−α
(3.4b)
kˆ
yˆ
=
α
(1 + φ)(1 + ρ)ν exp(x)
(3.4c)
kˆ
h¯
=
[
α
(1 + φ)(1 + ρ)ν exp(x)
] 1
1−α
(3.4d)
e0 =
1
ψ
(
1 + n
γ
ν − 1
)
(3.4e)
h¯ =
ν
ψ
[
(1 + φ)(1 + ρ)
1 + n
− 1
](
h¯1 +
1 + n
γ
fˆ
w˜
)
(3.4f)
According to (3.4a) and (3.4b), an increase in the technological progress growth rate x,
the selfishness parameter φ, the time preference rate ρ, or the growth rate of human
capital ν, ceteris paribus, raises the BGP interest rate and has the opposite effect on
the real wage. This is due to the induced decrease in physical capital as (3.4c) or (3.4d)
shows and the induced increase in labor supply as (3.4f) suggests.
An increase in the population growth rate n, ceteris paribus, lessens the hours worked
by households, as (3.4f) suggests. As for the time a household allocates to schooling,
according to (3.4e), it increases as n increases. A rise in the intergenerational knowledge
spill-over coefficient γ means young households are inheriting more human capital from
their parents, which causes them to reduce the time they allocate to schooling. An
improvement in ψ, the household’s ability to learn, will also result in a decrease in the
time allocated to education. This latter impact as well as that of an increase in the
tuition rate are furthered in the next section.
4 The Numerical Solution
First, I have normalized the life span of a household to nine years and each of the
three stages of the life-cycle lasts three years. Fowler and Young (2004) took a similar
approach in solving numerically their model. The rest of the model is calibrated to
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match some balanced growth facts observed in Quebec over the sample period 1981-
2013.
The population growth rate– The population Nt is made up of young, mature, and
retired households. It grows exponentially at the rate n, i.e., Nt = N0(1+n)
t. To have
an estimate of n, I have regressed the natural logarithm of the population aged 15 and
over on an intercept and a linear time trend. The data used are from Statistics Canada
and the ordinary least squares estimate of the annual population growth rate is .009. 6
The equivalent compound triennial rate is 2.7%.
The physical capital’s share– I have used Statistics Canada’s income based gross
domestic product (GDP) to compute α, the share of physical capital in the aggregate
output, following Cooley and Prescott (1995) and Gomme and Ruper (2005). This
share is defined as the ratio of the unambiguous physical capital income to the total
unambiguous incomes
α =
unambiguous physical capital income
GDP-ambiguous income
.
The unambiguous capital income is made up of the income-based GDP estimates that
are considered as remunerating specifically the physical capital input. It consists of cor-
porate profits before tax, interest and miscellaneous investment income, and the capital
depreciation allowance. As for the ambiguous income, it remunerates indistinctly both
labor and capital. It comprises the net income of farm operators and unincorporated
business, the taxes on factors of production and products, and the statistical discrep-
ancies. The average of this share is .313.
The technological progress growth rate– I have computed this parameter doing some
growth accounting. Log-differentiating (2.3) gives
x =
∆ lnYt
1− α
−
α
1− α
∆ lnKt −∆ lnHt.
I have used real GDP, real gross capital stock, and the total hours worked as respective
measures of Yt, Kt, and Ht. The average annual growth rate of technological progress
turns out to be .01, which is equivalent to .03 over three years.
The human capital growth rate– The long-run growth rate of the aggregate output
is (1 + n)ν exp(x) − 1. I have run a log-linear regression of the real output on an
intercept and a time trend using annual data from Statistics Canada. From now on, I
define output as the sum of household final consumption expenditure and business gross
fixed capital formation. This econometric model fits 98% of the observed data. The
slope parameter, which equals .027, gives an estimate of the annual long-run output
growth rate. This growth rate is equivalent to 8.1% over three years. One solves for ν,
the human capital growth rate, equating this latter estimate to the expression (1 +
n)ν exp(x)− 1, which yields ν = 1.02.
The other parameters and ratios – According to the labor force survey by Statis-
tics Canada, over the period 1981-2013, households in Quebec aged 15-24 allocated, on
6The log-linear model, lnNt = lnN0 + t ln(1 + n), explains 99.5% of the observed variability in
Quebec’s population, with all the coefficients being statistically significant.
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average, 15.2 hours a week to part-time work while those aged 25 and over worked,
on average, 36.7 hours a week. It emerges from the 2001 and 2006 census of Canada
that the average weeks worked mostly part-time and full-time in Quebec are respec-
tively 35.4 and 45.4. Besides, according to the Statistics Canada’s general social survey
(GSS), students and workers in Quebec allocated, on average between 1986 and 2010,
respectively 10.78 and 10.44 hours a day to personal care, which include night sleep
and meals at home. I have therefore computed l0 and l1 as the ratios of the total hours
worked by young and mature households to their respective total discretionary time,
which gives .112 and .337 respectively. 7
The GSS data also reveals that, between 1986 and 2010, students in Quebec allocated,
on average, 6.3 hours a day to professional activities, i.e., both labor, education and
related activities. Subtracting the weekly hours worked by young households from the
time they allocated weekly to their professional activities enables computing the share
of time they allocated to education e0, which equals .234.
The average investment-output ratio is .2. Recall that output is defined as the sum
of consumption and investment. Since physical capital completely depreciates from
one period to the other, one has Kt+1 = It, where It denotes the aggregate invest-
ment. 8 As the model constrains both variables to grow at the same rate, one has
(1 + n)ν exp(x)kˆ/yˆ = iˆ/yˆ along the BGP. This implies the capital-output ratio kˆ/yˆ
is .19.
The value of a household’s human capital stock only affects the level of variables and
has no impact on parameters and ratios. I have therefore normalized h¯1 to unity. As for
the intergenerational knowledge spill-over coefficient γ, the highest value it can assume
is .8. Otherwise tuition rate would be negative, meaning one has to pay a household
before he forgo labor or leisure to allocate time to education because he is already well
instructed. For γ lower than .8, the share of tuition fees in the aggregate output implied
by the model will be much higher than the actual one, which is about .001. The value
assigned to γ impacts on such parameters as the time preference rate ρ, the leisure
weight σ, and the selfishness parameter φ. Whereas ρ increases along with γ, both σ
and φ decrease.
All the other parameters and the initial position of the economy are deduced from
what preceded. Table 4.1 displays the calibrated parameters.
The calibration exercise points out a high selfishness. Given the high values of φ and ρ
displayed in Table 4.1, .3 and .21 respectively, it appears that households put more
weight on their own current consumption than on their children’s. As a result, even
though the educational transfer exceed the tuition fees, students still have to work and
borrow money to finance their consumption. One can interpret the educational transfer
as a lump-sum tax raised on mature households’ income and entirely transfered to the
younger generation as de la Croix and Michel (2002, pp 129-30) did. In this particular
case, the analysis of the BGP indicates that students cannot pay their tuition and live
7The discretionary time is the number of hours that are not allocated to personal care.
8The annual depreciation rate of physical capital is 5.4 %, which means it lasts about eighteen-and-
a-half years. Thus, assuming physical capital completely depreciates within one time interval primarily
means a complete depreciation over one generation.
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Table 4.1: The Parameters of the Model
Households n Population growth rate .027
γ Knowledge spill-over coefficient .8
ν Human capital growth rate 1.02
ρ Time preference rate .21
σ Leisure weight 4.145
φ Selfishness parameter .3
ψ Household ability to learn 1.347
Firms x Technological progress growth rate .01
α Physical capital share .313
on the grants or loans they receive from the government. They end up with debts after
their education.
It is also worth noting that schooling accounts for 28.4%, i.e., (1 + n)/γ − 1, of a
household’s human capital and the estimated value for the ability to learn of households,
1.35, as it appears in Table 4.1, is very high.
The model is now solved numerically assuming in turn changes brought about by
a shock to the tuition rate and the household’s ability to learn. These parameter and
exogenous variable are influential in households’ decision to invest in education. In
each of the two cases investigated, the economy is hit by an expected and permanent
exogenous shock occurring the first period. The model is simulated over ten periods
of time and the transitional dynamics of such key variables as the time allocated to
education and labor, the human and physical capital stocks, the educational transfer,
wage, and output are sketched in Figure 4.1. The simulations are implemented in
Matlab using the package Dynare.
How a new BGP is reached after a one percent permanent increase in the tuition rate
is plotted in blue line in Figure 4.1. When education becomes less affordable, students
initially decrease the time they allocate to education (panel 1) to increase the time they
allocate to labor (panel 3). At the same time, mature households decrease the time they
allocate to labor (panel 4) because wage has decreased (panel 5) and interest rate has
increased. The rise in interest rate raises mature households’ wealth (panel 6), which
induces a rise in the educational transfer they grant their children (panel 8). This then
encourages students to work less and allocate more time to education. When the new
BGP is reached, the time allocated to education returns to its initial level. 9 So do
the hours worked and wage but the stocks of human capital, the aggregate output, and
the educational transfer remain higher. This enables us to conclude that the increase
in the tuition rate favors education and growth.
The red lines in Figure 4.1 show the transitional dynamics after a .1% rise in the
household’ ability to learn. The shapes of these transitional dynamics are, in most
cases, the opposite of those generated by the rise in the tuition rate. The increase
9According to relation (3.4e), the time allocated to education along the BGP does not depend on
the tuition rate.
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Figure 4.1: Estimates of the Dynamic Paths after a Permanent 1% Rise in the Tuition
Rate and a .1% Rise in the Household’s Ability to Learn
Table 4.2: Simulated Correlation with Output
e0t h1t ǫˆ1t
Shock on fˆt .138 .951 .998
Shock on ψt .761 .953 .999
in the household’s ability to learn occasions an economic downturn. Households have
ended up allocating less time to education and the level of human capital stock, output,
and educational transfer reached are lower than in the previous case.
For each of the two shocks, Table 4.2 displays the correlation coefficients of the
simulated output series with the time allocated to education, the stock of human capital,
and the educational transfer. All the two shocks reveal a positive and high correlation
between the aggregate output and the variables of interest. The correlation coefficients
are higher in the case of a rise in the household’s ability to learn.
5 Discussion
I have used herein an altruistic OLG model in which young households receive from
their parents some home education and financial support. They then add to their
human capital stock by completing some formal education while working part-time.
Some theoretical evidence emerge from the model: (1) when the tuition is proportional
to the time allocated to education, the marginal rate of substitution of education for
labor is greater than unity in absolute value, (2) within an altruistic economy, young
households allocate more time to leisure than their parents do. The DDGE model has
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then been calibrated to match some balanced growth facts observed in the Province of
Quebec over the sample period 1981-2013. The calibration results indicate inter alia
that parents are selfish towards their children and education accounts for 28.4% of a
household’s human capital. Thereafter the calibrated model has been used to investigate
the contribution to economic growth of human capital accumulation through education.
To do that I have first identified a parameter and an exogenous variable that could affect
a household’s decision to invest in education. This parameter is the household’s ability
to learn and the exogenous variable is the tuition rate. Then, the model has been solved
numerically and simulated assuming in turn a permanent increase in the tuition rate
and the household’s ability to learn. It turns out that human capital accumulation
through education promotes growth.
After these simulations, I now address some topical issues in Quebec. Should the gov-
ernment increase tuition as the former Liberal Finance Minister Mr Raymond Bachang
announced in his 2011-2012 budget speech? Were students right to protest against this
decision, were their worries justified? My model predicts that an increase in the tuition
rate will not at all affect, in the long-run, the time allocated to education. The time
allocated to education and labor as well as real wage will move back to their initial
levels after falling. Human capital stocks and output will increase.
Would education become less affordable after the increase in tuition as some of the
protesters sustained? My model predicts that the rise in the tuition rate will not harm
students’ ability to pay for their education since during the transition to the new BGP,
parents (or the society) will adjust accordingly the financial support they grant them.
I will now use the model to assess three education policy measures: (1) free university
education in Quebec as proposed by some students union leaders, (2) indexing tuition to
the rate of growth of households’ disposable income, as the Parti Que´be´cois led by Mrs
Pauline Marois recommended in February 2013 during the submit on higher education,
and (3) investing in cultural and sportive activities on campuses and acquiring up-to-
date didactic resources.
Free education means a negative shock to the tuition rate. The effects of this measure
will be the opposite of those illustrated in the previous section. At first, education will
become popular insofar as the share of time allocated to this activity will rise. After
some periods, this share will move down to its initial level. Output and human capital
will fall.
On the other hand, indexing the tuition rate is equivalent to maintaining the status quo
in the normalized model. The economy will keep moving along its initial BGP.
As for investing in extra-curricular activities on campuses or in new didactic resources,
this will improve students’ ability to learn. With less effort, they could accumulate the
same amount of knowledge as previous cohorts. But, a substantial reduction in the time
allocated to education will end up reducing the level of human capital stock. A way of
avoiding this fall in human capital stock, when implementing this policy, would be not
to reduce the financial help granted to students.
To finish with, I address a modeling issue. A household’s human capital depends
on both the time he has allocated to education and his ability to learn. I have not
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included tuition or educational expenses as some authors did. A reason why I have
chosen not to is that, since the time the decision to increase tuition the way the Liberal
Party proposed was abolished by the Parti Que´be´cois, universities have been able to
cut their budget to deliver the same quality of education. I have therefore concluded it
would not be, at this stage, efficient including tuition in the human capital production
function. Including, later, tuition in the human capital production function will be
quite straightforward. One has just to define the actual household ability to learn as
the product of tuition rate and a human capital productivity parameter that has been
so far unobserved.
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Appendices
A The Households’ Optimization Problem
As it appears on page 6, the household born at time t seeks to maximize his life-cycle
utility
ut =
∞∑
t=0
[
1 + n
(1 + φ)(1 + ρ)
]t 2∑
g=0
1
(1 + ρ)g
[ln cgt+g + σ lnλgt+g] .
subject to:
λgt = 1− egt − lgt, 0 ≤ egt, lgt, λgt ≤ 1
h1t+1 = (1 + ψte0t)h0t, ψ > 0
h0t =
γ
1 + n
h1t, 0 < γ < 1
a1t+1 = wtl0th0t + ǫ1t − c0t − fte0t
a2t+2 = wt+1l1t+1h1t+1 + (1 + rt+1)a1t+1 − c1t+1 − (1 + n)ǫ1t+1
c2t+2 = (1 + rt+2)a2t+2,
given ft, rt and wt.
This optimization problem can be solved either for a single generation of households
over the three periods of his life-cycle using the method of Lagrange or cross-sectionally
for the three contemporaneous generations of households using the equation of Bellman.
We have derived the FOCs and the Euler equations using in turn each of these two
methods. But beforehand, I have reduced the number of constraints from eight to four
by substituting the three time constraints in the objective function and replacing h0t, the
human capital stock inherited at birth, by its expression in the rest of the constraints.
A.1 Solving the Problem Using the Method of Lagrange
Lt = max
∞∑
t=0
[
1 + n
(1 + φ)(1 + ρ)
]t
[ln c0t + σ ln(1− e0t − l0t)]
∞∑
t=0
[
1 + n
(1 + φ)(1 + ρ)
]t{ 1
(1 + ρ)
[ln c1t+1 + σ ln(1− l1t)] +
1
(1 + ρ)2
ln c2t+2
}
+ µ1t
[
γ
1 + n
wth1tl0t + ǫ1t − c0t − fte0t − a1t+1
]
+ µ2t [wt+1h1t+1l1t+1 + (1 + rt+1)a1t+1 − c1t+1 − (1 + n)ǫ1t+1 − a2t+2]
+ µ3t [(1 + rt+2a2t+2 − c2t+2] + µ4t
[
(1 + ψte0t)
γ
1 + n
h1t − h1t+1
]
,
where the variables µ1t, . . . , µ4t are the Lagrange multipliers or shadow prices and the
variables ft, rt, wt, and ψt are given.
A.1 Solving the Problem Using the Method of Lagrange 19
The FOCs
c0t :
[
1 + n
(1 + φ)(1 + ρ)
]t 1
c0t
= µ1t (A.1a)
c1t+1 :
[
1 + n
(1 + φ)(1 + ρ)
]t 1
1 + ρ
1
c1t+1
= µ2t (A.1b)
c2t+2 :
[
1 + n
(1 + φ)(1 + ρ)
]t 1
(1 + ρ)2
1
c2t+2
= µ3t (A.1c)
e0t :
[
1 + n
(1 + φ)(1 + ρ)
]t σ
1− e0t − l0t
+ ftµ1t = ψt
γ
1 + n
h1tµ4t (A.1d)
l0t :
[
1 + n
(1 + φ)(1 + ρ)
]t σ
1− e0t − l0t
=
γ
1 + n
wth1tµ1t (A.1e)
l1t+1 :
[
1 + n
(1 + φ)(1 + ρ)
]t 1
1 + ρ
σ
1− l1t+1
= wt+1h1t+1µ2t (A.1f)
h1t+1 : wt+1l1t+1µ2t +
γ
1 + n
wt+1l0t+1µ1t+1
+(1 + ψt+1e0t+1)
γ
1 + n
µ4t+1 = µ4t (A.1g)
a1t+1 : (1 + rt+1)µ2t = µ1t (A.1h)
a2t+2 : (1 + rt+2)µ3t = µ2t (A.1i)
ǫ1t+1 : (1 + n)µ2t = µ1t+1 (A.1j)
µ1t :
γ
1 + n
wth1tlot + ǫ1t − c0t − fte0t = a1t+1 (A.1k)
µ2t : wt+1h1t+1l1t+1 + (1 + rt+1)a1t+1
−c1t+1 − (1 + n)ǫ1t+1 = a2t+2 (A.1l)
µ3t : (1 + rt+2a2t+2 = c2t+2 (A.1m)
µ4t : (1 + ψte0t)
γ
1 + n
h1t = h1t+1 (A.1n)
The leads in the second and third elements on the left-hand side of (A.1g) come from
the fact that a fraction of the level of human capital stock h1t+1 chosen by a young
household at time t is inherited by his children during the next time period. The lead
of the Lagrange multiplier on the right-hand side of (A.1j) points to the fact that the
educational transfer is granted by a household born at time t and cashed by households
born at t+ 1.
Now, let us get rid of the Lagrange multipliers in the FOCs (A.1a) through (A.1j)
by substituting some equations or their first lead into others and rearranging to get
σc0t =
γ
1 + n
wth1t(1− e0t − l0t) (A.2a)
σc1t+1 = wt+1h1t+1(1− l1t+1) (A.2b)
(1 + rt+1)c0t = (1 + ρ)c1t+1 (A.2c)
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(1 + rt+2)c1t+1 = (1 + ρ)c2t+2 (A.2d)
c1t+1 = (1 + φ)c0t+1 (A.2e)
γ
[
l0t+1 +
(
1 +
1 + n
γ
ft+1
wt+1h1t+1
)
e0t+1
]
+ l1t+1 =
1 + rt+1
ψt
wt
wt+1
(
1 +
1 + n
γ
ft
wth1t
)
−
γ
ψt+1
(
1 +
1 + n
γ
ft+1
wt+1h1t+1
)
(A.2f)
Relation (A.2a), for instance, is obtained after plugging (A.1a) into (A.1e) and rear-
ranging. We now focus on showing how one gets (A.2f). Combine (A.1d) and (A.1e),
to express µ4t as a function of µ1t
µ4t =
(
wt +
1 + n
γ
ft
h1t
)
µ1t
ψt
.
Plugging this latter expression and its first lead into (A.1g) yields
wt+1l1t+1µ2t +
γ
1 + n
wt+1l0t+1µ1t+1
+
γ
1 + n
(1 + ψt+1e0t+1)
(
wt+1 +
1 + n
γ
ft+1
h1t+1
)
µ1t+1
ψt+1
=
(
wt +
1 + n
γ
ft
h1t
)
µ1t
ψt
.
Replacing in the above equation µ1t and µ1t+1 by their expressions as they respectively
appear in (A.1h) and (A.1j) helps get rid of all the Lagrange multipliers
[
wt+1l1t+1 + γwt+1l0t+1 +
γ
ψt+1
(1 + ψt+1e0t+1)
(
wt+1 +
1 + n
γ
ft+1
h1t+1
)]
µ2t
=
1 + rt+1
ψt
(
wt +
1 + n
γ
ft
h1t
)
µ2t.
Rearranging thereafter, one gets (A.2f).
A.2 Solving the Problem Using the Equation of Bellman
The state variables in our dynamic model are a1t, a2t, and h1t. These three variables
are enough to determine the level of the social welfare at time t. Likewise, their future
values determine the future level of the social welfare. The Bellman equation enables
to link recursively the social welfare of the three generations of households coexisting
A.2 Solving the Problem Using the Equation of Bellman 21
at time t to that of the next coexisting generations of households.
V(a1t, a2t, h1t) = max ln c0t + σ ln(1− e0t − l0t) +
1 + φ
1 + n
[ln c1t + σ ln(1− l1t)]
+
(
1 + φ
1 + n
)2
ln c2t +
1 + n
(1 + φ)(1 + ρ)
V(a1t+1, a2t+1, h1t+1)
+ µ˜1t
[
γ
1 + n
wth1tl0t + ǫ1t − c0t − fte0t − a1t+1
]
+ µ˜2t [wth1tl1t + (1 + rt)a1t − c1t − (1 + n)ǫ1t − a2t+1]
+ µ˜3t [(1 + rt)a2t − c2t] + µ˜4t
[
(1 + ψte0t)
γ
1 + n
h1t − h1t+1
]
The FOCs
c0t :
1
c0t
= µ˜1t (A.3a)
c1t :
1 + φ
1 + n
1
c1t
= µ˜2t (A.3b)
c2t :
(
1 + φ
1 + n
)2 1
c2t
= µ˜3t (A.3c)
e0t :
σ
1− e0t − l0t
+ ftµ˜1t = ψt
γ
1 + n
h1tµ˜4t (A.3d)
l0t :
σ
1− e0t − l0t
=
γ
1 + n
wth1tµ˜1t (A.3e)
l1t :
1 + φ
1 + n
σ
1− l1t
= wth1tµ˜2t (A.3f)
h1t+1 :
1 + n
(1 + φ)(1 + ρ)
∂V(a1t+1, a2t+1, h1t+1)
∂h1t+1
= µ˜4t (A.3g)
a1t+1 :
1 + n
(1 + φ)(1 + ρ)
∂V(a1t+1, a2t+1, h1t+1)
∂a1t+1
= µ˜1t (A.3h)
a2t+2 :
1 + n
(1 + φ)(1 + ρ)
∂V(a1t+1, a2t+1, h1t+1)
∂a2t+1
= µ˜2t (A.3i)
ǫ1t : (1 + n)µ˜2t = µ˜1t (A.3j)
We dropped the FOCs with respect to the shadow prices µ˜1t, . . . , µ˜4t. The deriva-
tives ∂V()/∂h1t+1 , ∂V()/∂a1t+1, ∂V()/∂a2t+1 respectively in the FOCs (A.3g), (A.3h),
and (A.3i) are unknown and will be found using the envelope conditions.
The envelope conditions
∂V(a1t, a2t, h1t)
∂h1t
= wtl1tµ˜2t +
γ
1 + n
wtl0tµ˜1t + (1 + ψte0t)
γ
1 + n
µ˜4t ⇒
∂V(a1t+1, a2t+1, h1t+1)
∂h1t+1
= wt+1l1t+1µ˜2t+1 +
γ
1 + n
wt+1l0t+1µ˜1t+1
+ (1 + ψt+1e0t+1)
γ
1 + n
µ˜4t+1 (A.4a)
22 B THE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL
∂V(a1t, a2t, h1t)
∂a1t
= (1 + rt)µ˜2t ⇒
∂V(a1t+1, a2t+1, h1t+1)
∂a2t+1
= (1 + rt+1)µ˜2t+1 (A.4b)
∂V(a1t, a2t, h1t)
∂a2t
= (1 + rt)µ˜3t ⇒
∂V(a1t+1, a2t+1, h1t+1)
∂a2t+1
= (1 + rt+1)µ˜3t+1 (A.4c)
The envelope conditions (A.4a) through (A.4c) can now be plugged respectively into
the FOCs (A.3g), (A.3h), and (A.3i). After that, one gets rid of the shadow prices in
the FOCs to have
σc0t =
γ
1 + n
wth1t(1− e0t − l0t) (A.5a)
σc1t = wth1t(1− l1t) (A.5b)
(1 + rt+1)c0t = (1 + ρ)c1t+1 (A.5c)
(1 + rt+1)c1t = (1 + ρ)c2t+1 (A.5d)
c1t = (1 + φ)c0t (A.5e)
γ
[
l0t+1 +
(
1 +
1 + n
γ
ft+1
wt+1h1t+1
)
e0t+1
]
+ l1t+1 =
1 + rt+1
ψt
wt
wt+1
(
1 +
1 + n
γ
ft
wth1t
)
−
γ
ψt+1
(
1 +
1 + n
γ
ft+1
wt+1h1t+1
)
(A.5f)
B The General Equilibrium Model
Our dynamic deterministic general equilibrium model is made up of fifteen equations
and has seventeen variables. Two of these seventeen variables, ft and ψt are exogenous,
i.e., they are set outside the model. The other fifteen variables are endogenous in the
sense they are determined by the behavior of optimizing agents. The fifteen equations
are listed in the next subsection. The non-stationary variables are normalized, i.e.,
they are divided by their growth components. This gives rise to the variables yˆt =
Yt/[N0tν
t exp(xt)], kˆt = Kt/[N0tν
t exp(xt)], h¯t = Ht/(1 + n)ν
t, w˜t = wt/ exp(xt),
h¯1t = h1t/ν
t, and zˆt = zt
/
[νt exp(xt)] with zt = {a1t, a2t, c0t, c1t, c2t, ft, ǫ1t}. Note
that in solving numerically the model, the variables aˆ1t, aˆ2t, ht, and kˆt are considered
as predetermined, i.e., their values at t+ 1 is chosen at time t by agents.
σcˆ0t =
γ
1 + n
w˜th¯1t(1− e0t − l0t) (B.1a)
σcˆ1t = w˜th¯1t(1− l1t) (B.1b)
(1 + rt+1)cˆ0t = (1 + ρ)ν exp(x)cˆ1t+1 (B.1c)
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(1 + rt+1)cˆ1t = (1 + ρ)ν exp(x)cˆ2t+1 (B.1d)
cˆ1t = (1 + φ)cˆ0t (B.1e)
γ
[
l0t+1 +
(
1 +
1 + n
γ
fˆt+1
w˜t+1h¯1t+1
)
e0t+1
]
+ l1t+1 =
1 + rt+1
exp(x)ψt
w˜t
w˜t+1
(
1 +
1 + n
γ
fˆt
w˜th¯1t
)
−
γ
ψt+1
(
1 +
1 + n
γ
fˆt+1
w˜t+1h¯1t+1
)
(B.1f)
(1 + ψte0t)
γ
1 + n
h¯1t = h¯1t+1 (B.1g)
γ
1 + n
w˜tl0th¯1t + ǫˆ1t − cˆ0t − fˆte0t = ν exp(x)aˆ1t+1 (B.1h)
w˜tl1th¯1t + (1 + rt)aˆ1t − cˆ1t − (1 + n)ǫˆ1t = ν exp(x)aˆ2t+1 (B.1i)
(1 + rt)aˆ2t = cˆ2t (B.1j)
kˆαt h¯
1−α
t = yˆt (B.1k)
α
yˆt
kˆt
= 1 + rt (B.1l)
(1− α)
yˆt
h¯t
= w˜t (B.1m)
aˆ1t
1 + n
+
aˆ2t
(1 + n)2
= kˆt (B.1n)
(γl0t + l1t)
h¯1t
1 + n
= h¯t (B.1o)
